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Abstract
This study focuses on trust formation and development in global buyer-supplier relationships. Trust affects all
business relationships, especially global business-to-business (B2B) transactions due to the distances between
buyers and suppliers. We use information signaling theory to examine how information indices and signals affect
buyers’ trust in suppliers in global B2B commerce. Specifically, we examine how buyers’ trust is affected by (1)
their perceptions of the national integrity and legal structure of suppliers’ country, and (2) third-party
verifications of suppliers on B2B exchanges. Because buyer-supplier relationships usually evolve over time, we
study how the effects of indices and signals change as the number of transactions between the partners
increases. A survey of global organizational buyers finds that perceptions of national integrity, legal structure,
and supplier verifications are all positively related to buyers’ trust. However, the number of prior transactions
between buyers and suppliers moderates the impact of perceived legal structure on buyers’ trust.
Keywords: Trust, Online Exchange, E-Commerce, Buyer-Supplier Relationship, Globalization, Supplier Verification,
Legal Structure, National Integrity, Information Signaling.
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Trust Across Borders: Buyer-Supplier Trust in Global
Business-to-Business E-Commerce
1. Introduction
This paper examines trust formation and development in e-commerce transactions between buyers
and suppliers from different countries. In existing research on trust in transactional exchanges,
trading partners are generally based in the same country. Yet globalization is changing who and
where the trading partners are. The world is “flattening” (Friedman, 2005) as technology drives and
facilitates the globalizing of culture and markets. Globalization involves more than reducing technical
barriers and transaction costs; it also requires human interaction across cultures and national
practices. Even with enabling technology and lower transaction costs, global trade still requires two or
more people or firms to interact to develop a cooperative venture across borders. We look at a
prototypic example of globalization facilitated by information technology – business-to-business (B2B)
e-commerce – where buyers and suppliers across the globe exchange goods and services using
information systems, such as online exchanges. These exchanges aggregate, make, and facilitate
markets (Bakos, 1998; Dai & Kauffman, 2002), and help firms bypass traditional distribution channels
and extend their reach globally (Senn, 2000). We study how the perceived country and firm
characteristics of trading partners influence trust formation and development on online exchanges.
Buyers’ trust in suppliers is critical in all commerce, but particularly e-commerce, due to more
pronounced information asymmetry, where buyers have incomplete information about suppliers.
Under these conditions, buyers risk selecting incompetent or opportunistic suppliers. This risk
impedes transactions between buyers and suppliers. (The risk is not one-sided because suppliers
also face problems such as non-payments by buyers.) In such situations, trust is “an important
lubricant” for economic exchanges to take place (Arrow, 1974, p. 23). The separation in time and
space between buyers and suppliers in cross-border e-commerce raises the risks associated with
information asymmetry and, consequently, increases the value of trust.
One way to increase buyers’ trust when there is information asymmetry is to close the information
gap. In markets suffering from information asymmetries, buyers can gather information about
suppliers (Eisenhardt, 1989), and suppliers could reassure potential buyers of their abilities and
intentions by providing credible information to reduce the asymmetries (Nayyar, 1990). There are two
types of information suppliers can provide: indices and signals (Spence, 1973). Indices are supplier
attributes that are inherently fixed or difficult to alter (e.g., the suppliers’ country of origin). In contrast,
signals are characteristics that suppliers can more easily invest in or acquire (e.g., web-seals that the
suppliers can buy). The aphorism “talk is cheap” captures the idea that signals must go beyond the
supplier saying “You can trust me” to be credible; effective signals must create a separating
equilibrium (Boulding & Kirmani, 1993) where it is costly for untrustworthy suppliers to acquire the
signals. Collectively, indices and signals influence buyers’ trust in suppliers only if they are costly to
change (indices) or acquire (signals).
Using Spence’s (1973) distinction, we examine how information indices and signals influence ecommerce buyers’ trust in suppliers. First, how do suppliers’ country characteristics influence buyers’
trust? Individual suppliers cannot easily change their country’s reputation, which is based on public
opinion and the behavior of many other suppliers. While a supplier could disguise its country of origin
or relocate to another country, such moves are costly, challenging, and potentially disruptive to its
business operations or existing industry ties, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises.
Hence, we consider suppliers’ country of origin as an information index. In particular, we focus on the
extent to which buyers’ trust is affected by their perceptions of the national integrity and legal
structure of the suppliers’ country.
Second, how do signals acquired by suppliers affect buyers’ trust, particularly in B2B exchanges?
Many exchanges provide tools such as feedback mechanisms to help trading partners evaluate each
other’s trustworthiness (Ba & Pavlou, 2002; Bolton, Katok, & Ockenfels, 2004; Pavlou, 2002; Pavlou
& Gefen, 2004). Some B2B exchanges also offer verification or web-seal services that suppliers can
use to verify information that they provide. These services help to assure buyers that the information
about verified suppliers’ is authentic. Do such services increase buyers’ trust? Previous studies that
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examine how web-seals affect buyers’ trust h inconclusive results. In this study, we propose
conditions for web-seals to be effective trust-building mechanisms.
Third, when do country attributes and web seals have more or less influence on buyer trust?
Specifically, could the effectiveness of perceived country attributes and supplier verification be
moderated by past transactions between buyers and suppliers? Examining this question
complements previous research that looks at initial trust formation in e-commerce (e.g., Lim, Sia,
Lee, & Benbasat, 2006; McKnight, Choudhury, & Kacmar, 2002b; Stewart, 2003). Surprisingly, we
show that buyers’ own experiences with suppliers do not necessarily diminish the value of trustenhancing indices and signals.
This study makes three contributions to trust research. First, by examining how both information
indices and signals serve as antecedents of trust, this study provides a more complete and
comprehensive understanding of the role that signaling theory plays in trust development than past
research does. Spence’s (1973) theory is about information indices as much as it is about information
signals. However, existing trust research that applyies signaling theory focuses only on information
signals, such as sellers’ reputation (e.g., Pavlou & Dimoka, 2006) or competitors’ prices (e.g., Trifts &
Häubl, 2003). In contrast, information indices as antecedents of trust have received little attention.
Second, we investigate antecedents of trust that are salient in cross-border, global B2B e-commerce
contexts. This focus contrasts with most existing research that focuses on localized e-commerce
where buyers and sellers are in the same country (e.g., Balasubramanian, Konana, & Menon, 2003;
Gefen, Karahanna, & Straub, 2003; Lim et al., 2006; McKnight et al., 2002b; Pavlou & Dimoka, 2006;
Stewart, 2003; Sun, 2010). Localized and globalized transactions have different implications for the
formation and impact of trust. In localized e-commerce, trading partners in the same country share
common knowledge about cultural and legal structures, ways to enforce contracts, and access to
legal recourse if transactions fail. Moreover, trading partners can more easily gather information
about each other’s competencies and reputation. Such conditions, which facilitate trust formation, are
more rare in globalized e-commerce, which makes it more difficult to establish trust in this context.
Furthermore, buyers’ trust in suppliers during cross-border transactions may be influenced by factors
that are otherwise not salient in localized e-commerce contexts. Our focus on such transactions fills
an important gap in our knowledge of online trust.
Finally, we examine the moderating role of past transactions on buyer-supplier trust. When assessing
suppliers’ trustworthiness in the early stages, buyers draw inferences from various sources, including
the characteristics of the suppliers’ country. Repeated transactions help buyers to accumulate
knowledge about their suppliers, and may reduce the influence of country characteristics on buyers’
trust. We find that past transactions do mitigate some, but not all, impacts of country characteristics
on buyers’ trust. This suggests that although suppliers can build up trust through repeated
transactions, factors that are outside their direct control also affect buyers’ trust in them. This finding
has important implications for firms and policy makers.

2. Trust
We define buyers’ trust in a supplier as the buyers’ willingness “to accept vulnerability based upon
positive expectations of the intention or behavior of” the supplier (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer,
1998, p. 295). Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) identify three components of trustworthiness:
ability, benevolence, and integrity. Ability is the supplier’s skills and competencies in meeting the
buyer’s needs. Ability is thus context-dependent. In the case of B2B transactions, the buyer would
focus on the supplier’s ability to satisfy their purchase requirements such as quality, timeliness, and
cost. Benevolence is the overall goodwill of the supplier towards the buyer. A benevolent supplier
would not behave opportunistically (in Williamson’s (1975) sense of opportunism) towards the buyer
for their own benefit. Rather, the supplier is concerned for the buyer’s well-being. Integrity is the
supplier’s adherence to principles (e.g., being honest and fair) that are acceptable to the buyer. The
supplier’s integrity is judged by the consistency in their behaviors, the credibility of their
communication, and their commitment to justice and fairness (Mayer et al., 1995).
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We focus on interorganizational trust in this study. This trust can emerge from prior history and
expectations of continued relations between the buyers and suppliers (Poppo, Zhou, & Ryu, 2008).
Past interactions provide opportunities for partners to build knowledge about each other (Koehn,
2003; Ratnasingam, 2005) and affect their satisfaction and trust in each other (Kwon & Suh, 2004;
Selnes, 1998). Expecting continuity in a relationship improves buyer-supplier trust by extending the
time horizon for mutual benefits and discouraging opportunistic short-term gains (Aulakh, Kotabe, &
Sahay, 1996; Poppo et al., 2008).
Interorganizational trust affects the organization and coordination of economic activities (McEvily,
Perrone, & Zaheer, 2003). It affects transaction costs (Chiles & McMackin, 1996), governance choice,
exchange performance (Gulati & Nickerson, 2008), information sharing (Dyer & Chu, 2003), and
negotiation and conflict (Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998) between the buyer and supplier.
Interorganizational trust also has positive transactional effects. Buyers’ trust in suppliers is positively
related to the buyers’ anticipated future interaction with the suppliers (Doney & Cannon, 1997;
Pavlou, 2002) and increases their commitment to and cooperation with their suppliers (Morgan &
Hunt, 1994). Buyers also allocate a higher share of their business to suppliers whom they trust
(Doney, Barry, & Abratt, 2007).

3. Antecedents of Buyers’ Trust
In most interorganizational transactions, buyers are concerned with micro, supplier-level
characteristics, such as the level of specific investments made by suppliers (Heide & John, 1990) or
the suppliers’ customer orientation (Doney et al., 2007). However, in international sourcing, buyers
are also concerned with macro, country-level characteristics, such as the political environment,
business practices, and regulations in the supplier’s country (Birou & Fawcett, 1993; Min, 1994; Min &
Galle, 1993). Therefore, it is important to examine both micro (supplier-level) and macro (countrylevel) factors in global B2B commerce.
Signaling theory (Spence, 1973) provides a framework to holistically examine how both micro and
macro factors affect buyers’ trust in suppliers. Information signals encompass micro, supplier-level
factors (since suppliers can manipulate their individual characteristics), whereas information indices
encompass macro, country-level factors (since individual suppliers cannot change these factors at
their own discretion).

3.1. Information Indices: Perceived National Integrity and Legal Structure
Information indices are observable, fixed, relatively unalterable attributes of an individual, such as
race or nationality (Spence, 1973). Earlier research has shown how foreign partners’ nationality –
and the corresponding value systems, cultural traits, and institutions – affects others’ prior
expectations about their behaviors (Ariño, de la Torre, & Ring, 2001). Country of origin influences
evaluations of products, people, and firms (Bilkey & Nes, 1982; Madon et al., 2001; Zaheer &
Zaheer, 2006), and firms from countries that are viewed as untrustworthy may be perceived as
untrustworthy (Zaheer & Zaheer, 2006).
Given the forces of globalization and proliferation of online B2B exchanges, buyers are increasingly
exposed to prospective suppliers from different countries with different business practices and
orientations (e.g., Ariño et al., 2001; Hofstede, 1980; Xiao & Tsui, 2007). In the context of global B2B
e-commerce, two indices that are associated with suppliers’ country of origin may be especially
important: national integrity and legal structure. National integrity is the extent to which typical actors
in a particular country are presumed to adhere to some set(s) of moral or ethical principles in their
actions (e.g., fairness and honesty towards others). Legal structure broadly refers to the rules and
regulations in a country that govern relationships between entities (e.g., individuals, firms,
organizations). These indices respectively relate to the social and formal conditions in partners’
countries, which are important considerations in cross-border relationships such as international joint
ventures (e.g., Holton, 1989; Luo, 2007) and trade (Birou & Fawcett, 1993). Because individual
suppliers cannot easily alter societal norms or modify business regulations on their own, national
integrity and legal structure are informative and should affect buyers’ beliefs about suppliers (Spence,
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1973). Specifically, perceptions of social and formal norms in a supplier’s country help to reduce the
information asymmetry about the supplier’s behaviors and shape a buyer’s expectations about the
1
supplier’s trustworthiness (e.g., Bachmann, 2001; Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Zaheer & Zaheer, 2006) .
Our concepts of national integrity and legal structure have parallels with the notions of situational
normality and structural assurance, respectively. These latter notions have often been used to explain
online trust (e.g., Chau, Hu, Lee, & Au, 2007; Gefen et al., 2003; McKnight, Choudhury, & Kacmar,
2002a, 2002b, 2004; Ou & Sia, 2010). Situational normality is the belief that the Internet environment
is in proper order and success in online transaction is likely because the situation is normal or
favorable. For example, buyers have higher trust in a retailing website when the nature of interaction
with the website is typical of other similar websites (Gefen et al., 2003; Ou & Sia, 2010). Structural
assurance refers to the belief that “structures like guarantees, regulations, promises, legal recourse,
or other procedures are in place to promote success” in e-commerce transactions (McKnight et al.,
2002a, p. 339). An online store with sufficient encryption and security capabilities, for instance, is
perceived to provide a secured transaction environment, which improves consumers’ trust and
purchase intention (Chau et al., 2007; Ou & Sia, 2010). However, there is a key distinction between
situational normality and structural assurance on one hand and national integrity and legal structure
on the other. Situational normality and structural assurance pertain more to the channels in which the
online transaction occurs, whereas national integrity and legal structure concern the environment the
trading partners are in. Consider a buyer who finds suppliers from different countries on an online
exchange. The buyer’s situational normality and structural assurance beliefs about the exchange do
not vary by suppliers – their perception about whether the exchange is a favorable and safe channel
is the same for all suppliers. However, the buyer’s perceptions of national integrity and legal structure
in different countries are likely to vary and affect the buyer’s relationships with suppliers at the dyadic
level on the exchange. This is the aspect of situational perceptions that we look at in this study.
Because the context of most research in online trust is localized e-commerce (where buyers and
sellers are from the same country), the relationship between buyers’ trust and their perceptions of
foreign suppliers’ country has received little attention. Yet given how e-commerce facilitates
international trade in today’s economy, understanding this relationship is important.

3.1.1. Perceived National Integrity
Most studies of integrity concentrate on how individual actors’ integrity affects the trust others place in
them. Trust in trading partners can also be related to the perceived level of integrity in the society
(i.e., national integrity) to which they belong (Fukuyama, 1995; Mackie, 2001). As noted above,
perception of national integrity relates to perceived social norms in suppliers’ country. When buyers
perceive that norms in a supplier’s country encourage positive behaviors such as cooperation or
honesty, they expect the supplier to adhere to these norms. Furthermore, societal norms can act as a
powerful form of social capital that inhibits deviant actions (Coleman, 1988; Doney, Cannon, &
Mullen, 1998). The higher the national integrity of a country, the less likely any particular supplier will
be to commit deviant actions that would sully its reputation. Conversely, in a country with lower level
of national integrity, deviant behaviors may be more accepted or tolerated.
Thus, perceived national integrity in a supplier’s country provides information about expected supplier
behavior, and shapes a buyer’s beliefs about the moral character of typical suppliers in that country.
These expectations and beliefs, in turn, affect the buyer’s cognition-based trust in a supplier’s
reliability and dependability (McAllister, 1995). Suppliers in countries with higher perceived national
integrity may be seen to be more likely to adhere to moral or ethical norms and show individual
integrity. The country’s norms also deter deviant supplier behavior. Therefore, buyers are likely to
trust suppliers in countries with higher national integrity.
1

There are other considerations influencing cross-border relationships, such as exchange rate fluctuations, and logistics support for
longer supply lines (Birou & Fawcett, 1993). While these factors affect buyers' choice of suppliers, they are not relevant to buyersupplier trust. Buyer can hedge exchange rate risk in futures markets, and use insurance markets and global logistic companies to
help handle international logistics. Presently, we do not have sufficient theoretical rationale to explore whether and how these
factors affect suppliers’ competency, benevolence, and/or integrity, or buyer-supplier trust at dyadic levels. Hence, we focus on
buyers’ perceptions of national integrity and legal structure in suppliers’ country in this study.
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H1: The perceived level of national integrity in the supplier’s country is positively related
to the buyer’s trust in the supplier.

3.1.2. Perceived Legal Structure
Trust in transactional relationships also depends on stable legal, political, and social institutions (Lane
& Bachmann, 1996). As an economy moves from local to national markets, transactions span longer
social and geographical distances, which requires institutional, formal trust (Zucker, 1986). Extending
this line of argument, we expect institution-based trust to play a significant role when transactions
take place in international markets.
The legal structure of a supplier’s country provides information about the formal norms in the suppliers’
country, and shapes buyers’ expectations of suppliers’ behaviors in two ways. First, institutional rules
and regulations in a country affect various facets of business operations and the types of firms that can
operate. For example, when a country has formalized licensing policies that govern businesses
formation and operation, opportunities for those that do not meet the requirements to operate are
reduced. A buyer may thus expect suppliers from countries with effective business laws and regulations
to be more competent. This is consistent with Zucker’s finding that the “emergence of licensing
standards … increased the certainty of performance characteristics” (1986, p. 94). Licensing provides
the buyer some assurance of a licensee’s ability to fulfill their purchase requirements.
Second, a country’s legal structure affects the extent to which contracts are enforceable, which
provides effective legal recourse when disputes arise. Contract laws are broad societal guarantees
needed by buyers and suppliers. The availability and effectiveness of these formal mechanisms are
important to foreign buyers since trade disputes are more likely to occur given the greater separation
in time and space of cross-boundary transactions. Furthermore, more market-oriented societies with
more non-familial/tribal transactions have developed institutions to punish those who are not fair and
trustworthy (Henrich et al., 2010). Suppliers may be deterred from behaving opportunistically or
dishonestly when such legal mechanisms are in place and enforced. A supplier that operates in such
an environment could be expected to be more benevolent and ethical.
Therefore, perceptions about legal structure affect expectations about the types of market participants
that one is likely to encounter. A buyer may expect a supplier from a country with strong legal
structure to be more trustworthy. With stronger legal structures, “undesirable entities” (i.e., those with
low ability, integrity, and/or benevolence) are also expected to self-select out from participating in the
market given their inability to meet legal requirements or concern for legal penalties for misbehavior.
H2: The perceived level of legal structure in the supplier’s country is positively related to
the buyer’s trust in the supplier.

3.2. Information Signals: Supplier Verifications and Web Seals
Signals are information that a supplier can send to better communicate their ability, benevolence, or
integrity to the buyer. For such signals to be credible, the cost of signaling must be negatively
correlated with the capability being signaled (Spence, 1973). Consider, for example, the provision of
product warranties by suppliers. For warranties to effectively signal supplier quality, the costs of
providing warranties must be high for low-quality suppliers, and low for high-quality suppliers.
Effective signals create what is known as a separating equilibrium, where high-quality and low-quality
suppliers have incentives to choose different signals (Boulding & Kirmani, 1993). Buyers can use
effective signals to distinguish between high-quality and low-quality suppliers. Ineffective signals
create a pooling equilibrium, in which high-quality and low-quality suppliers share incentives to invest
in the same signals. Buyers are then unable to differentiate the suppliers using those signals.
In global B2B e-commerce, many exchanges offer services, such as third-party verifications of
suppliers and web seals, as trust-building signals. These signals can play important roles in buyersupplier trust. B2B exchanges typically maintain low entry costs for suppliers to increase their pool of
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suppliers and raise the liquidity and activity levels among the exchanges’ users. The costs for
suppliers to join an exchange can range from nothing (free membership) to between US$300 and
US$7,500 per annum (paid memberships). Table 1 shows the annual paid membership fees (in
addition to free membership options) in three B2B exchanges (as of November 2008). These
membership fees are relatively low compared to suppliers’ annual sales volumes or the values of
typical B2B orders. The ease and affordability of exchange memberships make it easier and attractive
for a supplier to (1) engage in identity theft/misrepresentation, where it intentionally and wrongfully
submits information of a legally existing supplier, or (2) act as a phantom supplier by creating an
account for a nonexistent company. Buyers purchasing from such suppliers face the risks of nonperformance and usually have limited legal recourse. It is difficult to locate or take legal
actionsagainst a nonexistent company in a foreign country. Moreover, due to the distance between
trading partners in global B2B exchanges, buyers have difficulties verifying suppliers’ identities, which
affects their trust in these suppliers.
Table 1. Annual Paid Memberships in Three B2B Exchanges
B2B Exchange

Annual Membership Fee (US$)

Alibaba.com (www.alibaba.com)

$600 for TrustPass; $7,300 for Gold Supplier

EC Plaza (www.ecplaza.com)

$420

Gsm Exchange (www.gsmexchange.com)

$380

Therefore, buyers must rely on B2B exchanges to verify the suppliers’ identities. For a fee, a supplier
can initiate a third-party verification check through a B2B exchange. This verification check is often
out-sourced to independent companies, which verify that particular supplier on the exchange is a
registered company. In addition, these services also verify information posted by the supplier in the
exchange by inspecting the supplier’s production capabilities, premises, and factories. Such
verifications signal the legality of the supplier and the authenticity of the information about them in the
exchange. A supplier who passes the verification check usually receives a web seal on their
company’s profile page in the B2B exchange, which indicates that the information has been verified.
Typically, the web seal is valid for one year, after which the supplier needs to be re-verified.
The mere presence of web seals, though, may not lead to higher trust. Some studies show that Better
Business Bureau Online seals reduce the risk perceived by consumers (Grazioli & Javenpaa, 2000),
while other studies find that seals of approval, privacy seals, and industry seals do not significantly
affect customer trust (Fisher & Chu, 2009; Houston & Taylor, 1999; McKnight et al., 2004; Ou & Sia,
2010; Pennington, Wilcox, & Grover, 2003). The mixed results from these studies raise an important
question about when web seals serve as effective trust-enhancing signals. We believe there are two
essential conditions for web seals to improve buyer-supplier trust.

3.2.1. Condition 1
Does a particular web seal create the necessary separating equilibrium for it to be a credible signal?
When the costs to obtain verification web seals are substantial, they provide credible signals. Even
though the fees to initiate verification checks may be relatively low, the costs associated with having
the documentation and capabilities to meet the verification requirements are often high. For instance,
to pass the verification checks, suppliers must register their business and subject it to regulations,
demonstrate that they have the production capacity, and/or show the certifications they claim (e.g.,
ISO 9001). Those who cannot incur these costs would either fail the verification checks or avoid
undertaking them. Moreover, third-party companies that provide verification services have a
continuing reputational stake in the verifications being accurate and untainted. This stake in their
reputation is of greater value than acting opportunistically to help any particular supplier. As such,
independent verifications are conducted with care. Thus, third-party verifications serve as implicit
guarantees (Parkhe, 1998) and contribute to the formation of firm-specific trust (Zucker, 1986), just as
outside auditors do in the context of managing the principal-agent problem in management settings
(Antle, 1982, 1984; DeFond, Raghunandan, & Subramanyam, 2002).

Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 13, Issue 11, pp. 886-922, November 2012

892

Koh et al. / Trust in Global B2B E-Commerce

3.2.2. Condition 2
The presence of a separating equilibrium, however, may be a necessary but insufficient condition for
a web seal to be an effective signal. For the web seal to engender trust, buyers must care about the
characteristics that are being qualified and signaled. McKnight et al. (2004) suggests that a possible
reason why TRUSTe, a privacy web seal, did not improve consumer trust in their study was that the
respondents did not consider privacy to be an important web problem. As we point out earlier, the
authenticity of counterparties’ identities and claims are essential in B2B relationships. Heide and John
(1990) found that increased verification efforts by OEM buyers increased their joint action with the
supplier (e.g., in the areas of component testing, planning, and forecasting). Similarly, Gefen (2004)
found that quality certifications increased client trust in ERP software vendors. Because third-party
supplier verification creates a separating equilibrium (see Condition 1 above) and is important to
potential buyers in B2B commerce, we posit that:
H3: Supplier verification is positively related to the buyer’s trust in the supplier.

3.3. Effects of Indices and Signals on Trust over Repeated Interactions
Previous research has examined how initial trust formation is affected by institutional mechanisms
(e.g., McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998; Stewart, 2003; Zucker, 1986) or the specific use of
web-seals (e.g., McKnight et al., 2004; Pennington et al., 2003). However, do factors that influence
trust early in a buyer-supplier relationship have the same effect later in the relationship? Do the
effects of trust indices and signals change as buyer-supplier relationships develop? These are
important questions because buyer-supplier relationships can and do evolve over time.
When there are no transactions between the buyer and supplier, categorization processes such as
stereotyping should affect the levels of trust between them (McKnight et al., 1998). At this initial stage of
their relationship, buyers may expect a supplier to perform or behave like typical suppliers in that country.
These expectations are shaped by their perceptions of national integrity and legal structure. Thus, when a
buyer is unfamiliar with a supplier, information indices influence the buyer’s trust in the supplier.
However, while information indices provide some indications of the typical suppliers’ quality, the buyer
gains knowledge about the specific supplier through first-hand, repeated interactions (Koehn, 2003;
Ratnasingam, 2005). Cooperative history between partners in international alliances affects their trust
in each other (Parkhe, 1998). With repeated transactions, buyers should rely less on their perceptions
of the supplier’s country (i.e. information indices) in evaluating the supplier’s trustworthiness. Instead,
they should base their evaluation on past performance of the supplier (Ariño et al., 2001; Lane, 1998;
Zucker, 1986). Thus, we hypothesize that the influence of information indices on buyer’s trust decays
with more transactions between the buyer and supplier.
H4a: The effects of the perceived level of national integrity in the supplier’s country on
the buyer’s trust should decline as the number of transactions increases.
H4b: The effects of the perceived level of legal structure in the supplier’s country on the
buyer’s trust should decline as the number of transactions increases.
Do information signals in the form of supplier verifications and web-seals also become less influential
with more transactions? Given the different levels of firm-specific information that indices and signals
provide, we believe that there are structural differences in how these informational sources affect the
development of interorganizational trust. Indices are generic and provide little firm-specific
information. When only information about a supplier’s location is available, a buyer would treat the
supplier as typical of firms with similar attributes in that location (Spence, 1973). Direct experiences
with the supplier, however, allow the buyer to move from an average impression of the supplier’s
quality to a more precise assessment. Relative to indices, signals provide more firm-specific
information. Furthermore, because signals are in the firm’s control, the absence of a signal in itself is
also a signal, albeit a potentially counter-productive one. For instance, companies tend to purchase
only from suppliers who are verified or qualified in order to maintain corporate governance and
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manage liability risks. In our case, the legality of the supplier and authenticity of their claims
(ascertained through third-party verifications) are important criteria for the buyer regardless of the
length and strength of the buyer-supplier relationship. The buyer may interpret that something is
amiss when a long-term supplier is no longer verified – for example, they may wonder whether the
supplier’s license has been revoked or whether the supplier’s production capacity has changed.
2
Trading with this supplier would increase the buyer’s exposure to risk . This response is similar to
market reactions when experienced professionals (e.g., lawyers or doctors) and established
institutions (e.g., schools) lose their licenses or accreditations.
Therefore, unlike country-level indices, we do not expect repeat transactions between buyers and
suppliers to moderate the influence of supplier-specific signals on buyers’ trust. These signals provide
critical information about individual suppliers, and should remain relevant and important even when
the buyer has first-hand, direct experiences with the suppliers.

4. Method
4.1. Overview
We conducted an online survey of buyers on a global B2B exchange in September 2008. This
exchange, started in the late 1990s, is operated by a publicly listed firm in Asia. By 2010, it had more
than three million international users in its member base. The exchange handles products in multiple
industries, including agriculture, electronics, and textiles. Buyers and suppliers can search for and
post products, request quotes for price and terms, and contact one another through the exchange.
The exchange offers various services for suppliers, such as premium membership (US$4,500 per
3
annum) and third-party verification services (US$1,400 per annum) . It also provides services such as
banner advertising and reports on individual verified suppliers.
To develop the survey instrument, we first pre-tested using four organizational buyers from three
countries. We obtained feedback about the structure, questions, and cognitive load of the survey from
these buyers and refined the instrument. Next, we conducted four rounds of pretests that involved
600 randomly selected active buyers in the B2B exchange. Active buyers are those who had posted
at least one buying request in the exchange and had logged in at least once within the three months
before the survey. Since communication on the exchange (and in international trade) is primarily in
English, we did not translate the instrument into various languages.
Two weeks after the final round of pretesting, the B2B exchange randomly selected and invited 5,250
active buyers (excluding those in the pretests) to take part in the actual survey. We gave respondents
two weeks to complete the survey. The B2B exchange sent a first reminder email one week after the
initial invitation, and a second reminder email two days before the survey ended. To assure the
buyers of their confidentiality and anonymity, we informed them that their responses would be sent
directly to the research team, and that the exchange would only receive aggregated results and not
individual responses. In addition, we collected no identifying information during the survey. To further
encourage participation, respondents who completed the survey received a US$20 credit to purchase
reports from the exchange.
Our survey used a within-subject design. We asked the buyers to list company names or initials of
4
two suppliers whom they would consider for an imminent corporate purchase . At least one of the
2

3
4

On February 21, 2011, Alibaba.com announced that about 1% of its verified suppliers engaged in fraud against its buyers. These
fraudulent suppliers evaded the third-party verification process with the help of some Alibaba.com employees. Following the
announcement, Alibaba.com’s market capitalization dropped by almost US$1b, and its CEO and COO were replaced (although
Alibaba.com’s internal investigation confirmed that these executives were not involved in the incident). This incident shows that the
market places a high value on verified suppliers.
These rates are correct as of November 2008.
Traditionally, respondents are asked to identify purchase decisions that they have been involved in (e.g., Doney & Canon, 1997).
In such cases, it is possible that the measured post-transaction trust could differ from the unobserved pre-transaction trust. For
instance, a buyer may have a high level of trust in a particular supplier before a transaction. However, due to a below expectation
performance by the supplier, the buyer’s trust in this supplier may be lowered after the transaction. To overcome such issues, we
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suppliers needed to be a participant in the exchange so that we could examine the influence of thirdparty verifications. Buyers not making such a purchase could exit the survey and still receive a US$20
credit from the exchange. Buyers whose purchase decisions met these criteria provided information
5
on each supplier’s verification status (conditional on the supplier being listed in the exchange) ,
evaluated each supplier’s performance in past transactions (if any), and rated their trust in each
supplier. Finally, we asked the buyers for their perceptions of the national integrity and legal structure
in each supplier’s country.
Two hundred and eighty-seven buyers completed the survey, which provided information about 574
suppliers (two suppliers per respondent). The effective response rate is difficult to determine as not all
the 5,250 buyers sampled were making an imminent purchase on the exchange during the survey
period. The exchange found 19.95 percent of active buyers sent at least one enquiry to suppliers in a
two-week period. Using this type of query as a proxy for whether a buyer was making an imminent
purchase, the relevant sample size for this study is 1,048 buyers (5,250 x .1995) and the effective
response rate is 27.39 percent.
Appendix A shows the characteristics of our buyers, which includes their location and product
category of their imminent purchases. The average buyer in our dataset had three to five years of
B2B e-commerce experience. On average, the buyer’s company had between 10 and 19 employees
and sales between US$500,000 and US$999,000 in the previous financial year. The buyer had on
average purchased from between one and four other suppliers that are from the referent supplier’s
country. The median estimated transaction value of the imminent purchase was US$30,000. The B2B
exchange reported that these respondents’ characteristics and transaction values are representative
of those in the exchange. Forty-six percent of buyer-supplier pairs in our sample had prior
experiences with each other (see Table 2).
Table 2. Prior Transactions Between Buyers and Supplies
Number of past transactions
No prior transaction
Between 1 and 3 transactions
Between 4 and 6 transactions
Between 7 and 9 transactions
Between 10 and 19 transactions
20 transactions or more

Percentage
54%
26%
10%
4%
2%
4%

Note: Base on 574 pairs of buyer-supplier relationships in our sample.

Because the B2B exchange did not provide information about non-respondents, we could not compare
respondents’ attributes with those of non-respondents. Instead, to check for non-response bias, we
compared buyers who responded before the final reminder with those who responded after. There were
no significant differences between early and late respondents in company’s sales, number of employees,
purchase value, respondents’ education, working experience, and B2B e-commerce experience. This
suggests non-response bias is not a problem in our sample (Armstrong & Overton, 1977).

4.2. Measures
Appendix B presents the items that this study used. When appropriate, we specified the suppliers’
company name or initials in the questions’ stem by using information provided by the buyers. This
clarified the questions to the buyers, especially since they had to evaluate two suppliers in the survey.

5

895

asked buyers to consider an imminent purchase that they were making. This approach allows us to better relate (pre-transaction)
trust to purchase intention. Although there is a possibility that the buyers’ trust in suppliers was biased (where more trustworthy
suppliers were being considered for the transaction), we employed a within-subject research design to control for this potential bias
(see Appendix G).
As multiple suppliers could use the same company name, it was not feasible for the B2B exchange to provide information of the
supplier’s verification status. Therefore, we relied on buyers’ input for this information.
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4.2.1. Purchase Intention
Although this study focuses on antecedents of trust, we also measured outcomes of trust so that we
could relate our findings to past research and estimate the expected value of information indices and
signals. Because buyers evaluated their supplier before actual purchases, a relevant outcome of trust
is the likelihood of purchasing from that supplier.
Because the B2B exchange did not track actual transactions, and because some buyers also
evaluated suppliers that were not participating on the exchange, we could not use archived purchase
data in our analysis. Additionally, because buyers spend different amounts of time making their
purchase decisions, it would have been challenging to follow-up with them to get information about
their actual purchases. Therefore, we asked buyers to estimate on a 5-point Likert scale the likelihood
of making the imminent purchase with the particular supplier. Verbal statements of purchase
intentions are excellent predictors of actual purchase behavior (Armitage & Conner, 2001; Sheppard,
Hartwick, & Warshaw, 1988; Webb & Sheeran, 2006).

4.2.2. Buyer’s Trust
We used nine items from Mayer and Davis (1999) to measure the buyer’s trust in the supplier.
Sample survey items include “Supplier X is well qualified” and “Supplier X would not knowingly do
anything to hurt me”. We changed one of the items to focus on the supplier’s capabilities (instead of
skills as per Mayer and Davis’ (1999) measures) to make the question contextually relevant. We also
asked about the extent to which the supplier can be trusted.

4.2.3. National Integrity
We used two 5-point Likert scale items to measure the buyer’s perceptions of the national integrity in
a particular supplier’s country: the likelihood that suppliers in that country would behave with integrity
and do the right things in business deals. These items are similar to those that Morgan and Hunt
(1994) use in their study of dyadic retailer-supplier relationships; however, our items focused on the
buyer’s perception of all suppliers in the country instead on the individual focal suppliers. Appendix C
shows the average perceived national integrity ratings for the 50 supplier countries in our sample.

4.2.4. Legal Structure
The measure of the buyer’s perceptions of the legal structure in a supplier’s country came from two
sources. The first comprised three 5-point Likert scale items to measure the buyer’s confidence in the
legal systems in that country, and the perceived effectiveness of the laws and regulations in that
country to govern the suppliers’ operations and resolve business disputes, respectively.
The second source was the 2007 corruption perception index (CPI), administered by Transparency
International. The CPI is a composite index that provides information about perceptions of corruption
within countries. The index score ranges from 0 (high corruption) to 10 (low corruption). The 2007 CPI is
based on 14 sources that originate from 12 institutions, such as the Asian Development Bank, the
Economist Intelligence Unit, and the World Economic Forum. The average correlations between the
sources are .77, which suggests high overall reliability of the CPI (Lambsdorff, 2007). Moreover, Herzfeld
and Weiss (2003) found that a positive relationship between countries’ CPI scores and the degree to
which their citizens are willing to accept the established institutions to make and implement laws and
adjudicate disputes. Hence, CPI is a relevant external measure of legal structure perception for this study.
Appendix C shows the average perceived legal structure ratings and CPI scores for the 50 supplier
countries in our sample. These two measures correlate at .44 (p < .01), which supports the validity of
our survey measure of legal structure perceptions.

4.2.5. Supplier Verification
We asked the buyer to indicate the supplier’s verification status, provided that the supplier is listed in the
exchange. The buyer indicated “not sure” if they could not recall this information about the supplier. The
verification status indicator takes the value of 1 if the supplier was verified and 0 otherwise.
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4.2.6. Past Transactions
We accounted for the buyer’s experience with the supplier using the number of transactions between
them over the last 12 months, as reported by the buyer.

4.2.7. Supplier’s Performance
To control for supplier’s performance, we asked the buyer to compare the referent supplier to other
suppliers in terms of three performance criteria: price, product availability, and delivery (Doney &
Cannon, 1997). We measured the responses for each on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from
performing much worse than other suppliers to performing much better than other suppliers. The
neutral point on the scale was that the supplier’s performance was equal to other suppliers’. The
buyer indicated “not sure” if they were unable to ascertain the supplier’s relative performance.

4.2.8. Supplier Membership
We dummy coded supplier memberships to control for different membership types. We categorized
suppliers who were not on the B2B exchange as non-members. Among suppliers who were listed on
the exchange, we categorized those with paid memberships as paid members. The buyer indicated
“not sure” if they could not recall the supplier’s membership type in the B2B exchange. We used
suppliers on the exchange with free membership or whose membership types buyers could not recall
as the reference group in our analyses.

4.2.9. Same Country
Because cultural or ethnic similarity may influence trust, we controlled for whether the buyer and
supplier were from the same country using a dummy variable. Since the buyer indicated their and the
supplier’s countries during the survey, we matched their responses to code this dummy variable. The
variable takes the value of 1 if the buyer and supplier were from the same country and 0 otherwise.

4.2.10. China Supplier
Seventy percent of the suppliers in our sample were based in China, which reflectis the current state
of international trade where buyers actively source from China. We added a country dummy that
takes the value of 1 if the supplier was from China and 0 otherwise.

5. Analyses and Results
Since our respondents were from different countries, we assessed whether we should pool their
responses in our analyses. We conducted a Kruskal-Wallis test to assess differences among
respondents between countries (Appendix D). The results show that it is reasonable to pool
respondents across countries in our analyses. We also assessed the presence of common method
variance in two ways (Appendix D). First, we conducted Harman’s one-factor test. Second, in a
stronger, more refined test that fits our research setting, we compared (1) the covariance of buyer’s
trust in and likelihood of purchasing from one supplier (i.e., within-supplier covariance), and (2) the
covariance of buyer’s trust in one supplier and likelihood of purchasing from the other supplier (i.e.
between-supplier covariance). The results from both tests indicate that common method variance is
not a problem in our data.

5.1. Structural Equation Modeling
We analyzed our data using structural equation modeling. Structural equation modeling (SEM)
provides the flexibility to properly account for measurement error by having multiple indicators per
latent variable. It also allows us to test the overall model and model the error terms. In addition, we
can include a consequence of trust (i.e., purchase intention) in the structural model and estimate the
expected values of trust indices and signal. We did this using the Mplus (version 5.21) software,
which lets us model interaction using the latent moderated structural equations approach (Klein &
Moosbrugger, 2000). This approach results in relatively smaller bias of structural parameter estimates
and higher power to detect interaction effects than partial least square (Schermelleh-Engel, Werner,
Klein, & Moosbrugger, 2010).
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Appendix E shows the descriptive statistics and intercorrelations of the items. We mean-centered the
items for national integrity, legal structure, and past transactions before creating the interaction terms.
Using maximum likelihood, we simultaneously estimated the measurement and structural models. To
reduce the number of parameters to estimate, we assigned the ten survey items that measure buyer’s
trust into three parcels (Trust-A (4 items), Trust-B (3 items), and Trust-C (3 items)), and used them as
indicators of the latent variable buyer’s trust. Each parcel’s score is the average score of the assigned
items. The latent variable legal structure comprises four indicators – the three survey items and the
supplier’s country CPI score. We fixed the error variance of single-indicator variables (i.e., purchase
intention and past transactions) with the assumption that the reliability for each of these indicators is .85.
Using the Spearman Brown prophecy formula and Cronbach’s α for the measure of buyer’s anticipated
future purchase in Doner and Canon’s (1997) study, we estimated a reliability of .90 had we used a singleitem scale to measure purchase intention. Our assumed reliability of .85 is therefore conservative.
Also, because each respondent in our dataset provided two supplier-observations, individual
respondents’ observations may have correlated errors. To obtain robust variance estimate, we
clustered the observations by respondent to appropriately adjust the standard errors (Wooldridge,
2002). Lastly, when estimating the structural model, we treated “not sure” responses for supplier’s
price, product, and delivery performances as missing data. We assumed these responses to be
missing at random, which makes the use of maximum likelihood estimation with estimation of missing
data values appropriate and strongly preferable to listwise case deletion (Schafer & Graham, 2002).

5.2. Measurement Model
We conducted a confirmatory factor analysis and computed the Cronbach’s α of the multi-items
2
constructs in our model (Appendix F). The model fit is not significant (χ = 55.20, d.f. = 48, p > .10),
and the other fit indices also indicate good model fit (CFI = .99; RMSEA = .02; SRMR = .03). All items
loaded on their respective constructs. The Cronbach’s α estimates suggest the items have good
internal consistency. Good convergent validity is shown by higher correlations between items
reflecting the same construct than correlations between items reflecting different constructs (see
Appendix E). We tested discriminant validity of our constructs using a chi-square difference test
(Bagozzi, Yi, & Phillips, 1991). For each pair of constructs, we ran a chi-square difference test that
compared an unrestricted model (where correlation of the constructs was freely estimated) and a
restricted model (where correlation was fixed to unity). In all pair-wise comparisons, the two models
differ significantly on the chi-squared difference test (p < .001), with the unrestricted models having
better fit, which supports the discriminant validity of the constructs.

5.3. Structural Model
We estimated a baseline model with only the main effects. The test of fit for this model is significant
2
(χ = 352.04, d.f. = 113, p < .01), but the other fit indices indicate adequate model fit (CFI = .92,
RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .05). Based on the modification indices, we added covariance between trust
and purchase intention, and between the CPI and whether the supplier is from China. A buyer’s trust
and purchase intention may share common causes that we did not measure (e.g., buyer’s
commitment to supplier). Also, given that the proportion of China suppliers in our dataset is high and
that the CPI is a country-level score, it is reasonable to allow their error terms to correlate. We reestimated the model with these modifications (Model 1 in Table 3). Although the test of fit is still
2
significant (χ = 209.36, d.f. = 111, p < .01), the other goodness of fit indices improved (CFI = .97,
RMSEA = .04, SRMR = .04).
We next added two interaction terms, “national integrity x past transactions” and “legal structure x
past transactions”, to the structural model (Model 2 in Table 3). Including these interaction terms
makes the second model a non-nested model relative to the first model, and these two models have
overlapping but non-identical variance-covariance matrices (Vandenberg & Grelle, 2009). We
compared the models’ Akaike information criteria (AIC) and Bayesian information criteria (BIC) to
assess whether including the interaction terms is appropriate. These information criteria reward a
goodness of model fit and penalize a lack of model parsimony, and the model with the smaller AIC
and BIC is the better one (Vandenberg & Grelle, 2009). The AIC declined from 20686.42 in Model 1
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to 19482.23 in Model 2, and the BIC (adjusted for sample-size) declined from 20785.38 to 19559.98.
The relatively large reductions in information criteria values support the inclusion of these two
interaction effects in our structural model.

5.4. Results
Figure 1 presents the hypotheses testing results using Model 2 in Table 3. After controlling for the
supplier’s performance, the supplier’s membership category, whether the buyer and supplier are from
the same country, and whether the supplier is China based, we found that the favorable perception of
national integrity had a positive effect on buyers’ trust in the supplier (β2 = .18, p < .05). However, this
perception did not become less influential with increasing transactions (β3 = .10, p > .10). Therefore,
H1 is supported but H4a is not. Although the perception of national integrity perception appears to
have modest statistical impacts, its economic impacts are substantial and meaningful. We discuss the
practical impacts of our findings in Section 6.2.
Table 3. Structural Model Results
Model 1

Model 2

Model

Coeff.

Coeff.

Coeff.

β1: Buyer's trust → likelihood of purchase

0.94** (0.11)

0.93** (0.11)

0.92** (0.11)

β2: National integrity → buyer's trust

0.17* (0.08)

0.18* (0.08)

0.18* (0.08)

-

0.10 (0.07)

0.10 (0.07)

0.06 (0.06)

0.05 (0.06)

0.05 (0.06)

β5: Legal structure x past transaction →
buyer's trust

-

-0.09* (0.05)

-0.11* (0.05)

β6: Supplier verification → buyer's trust

0.20+ (0.11)

0.24* (0.11)

0.12 (0.14)

-

-

0.07 (0.06)

0.06* (0.03)

0.06* (0.03)

0.05 (0.03)

0.59** (0.12)

0.58** (0.12)

0.59** (0.11)

β10: Non member → buyer's trust

0.03 (0.07)

0.05 (0.06)

0.06 (0.06)

β11: Paid member → buyer's trust

-0.15+ (0.09)

-0.16+ (0.09)

-0.15+ (0.09)

β12: Same country → buyer's trust

0.06 (0.11)

0.02 (0.13)

0.02 (0.12)

0.04 (0.07)

0.02 (0.07)

0.02 (0.07)

-

-

β3: National integrity x past transaction →
buyer's trust
β4: Legal structure → buyer's trust

β7: Supplier verification x past transaction
→ buyer's trust
β8: Past transaction → buyer's trust
Controls
β9: Supplier's performance → buyer's trust

β13: China supplier → buyer's trust

χ (d.f.) 209.36 (111), p < .01
2

CFI

0.97

-

-

RMSEA

0.04

-

-

SRMR

0.04

-

-

AIC

20686.42

19482.23

19482.90

BIC

20785.37

19559.98

19561.83

Note: + p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The software package (Mplus) does not provide goodness of fit indices for Models 2 and
3, where we include the interaction terms.
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Figure 1. Summary of Results
We also found that (i) the perceived legal structure positively impacted buyers’ trust when the buyer
had relatively few prior interactions with the supplier, but that (ii) the effects of perceived legal
structure on buyers’ trust weakened as the number of interactions increased. The number of prior
buyer-supplier transactions negatively moderated the relationship between perceived legal
structure and buyer’s trust (β5 = -.09, p < .05), although the positive main effect of perceived legal
structure on trust was not statistically significant (β4 = .05, p > .10). These results collectively
support H2 and H4b. In addition, buyers’ trust was higher in suppliers who had been verified by a
third party compared with those who were not verified (β6 = .24, p < .05), which supports H3. Lastly,
a buyer’s trust in a supplier was positively related to the likelihood that the buyer would purchase
from that supplier (β1= .93, p < .01). This result is consistent with other studies on outcomes of trust
(e.g., Doney & Cannon, 1997; Pavlou, 2002).
We then added the interaction supplier verification x past transactions in Model 3. Since AIC and BIC
were higher in Model 3 than in Model 2 (see Table 3), there is no evidence to suggest that Model 3 is
a better model (Vandenberg & Grelle, 2009). This interaction term was also not significant (β7 = .07, p
> .10), which implies that the impact of a supplier’s verification status on buyer’s trust does not
diminish with more transactions between them.

5.5. Robustness Analyses
We conducted several analyses to check the robustness of our results (see Appendix G for details).
First, unobserved effects such as priming, social desirability, and buyer heterogeneity may bias our
results. For example, respondents might give positive evaluations of suppliers because they were
strongly considering these suppliers in their purchases. The respondents’ trust in individual suppliers
might also be affected by their disposition to trust (Balasubramanian et al., 2003; McKnight &
Chervany, 2001; McKnight et al., 1998) or by their trust in the exchange (Pavlou, 2002; Pavlou &
Gefen, 2004). Our within-subject design, where each respondent evaluated two suppliers, allows us
to account for these unobserved effects using a random effects model. The results using random
effect models show qualitatively similar conclusions as the results using SEM.
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Second, we replaced survey data about supplier’s membership types with available data from the
exchange. We also checked the sensitivity of our SEM results to different model specifications and
assumed reliability of single-indicator variables. Finally, we ran a multi-level mixed effects model
because the survey responses were nested within buyers. The results in these analyses are
consistent with the main results discussed above.

6. Discussion
Information systems researchers have examined the roles and impacts of interorganization systems
such as electronic data interchange (e.g., Mukhopadhyay, Kekre, & Kalathur, 1995) and electronic
infomediaries (e.g., Ghose, Mukhopadhyay, & Rajan, 2007). Online B2B exchanges are also
interorganization systems that help buyers and suppliers search for and connect with each other
(Pavlou, 2002). Yet firms do not establish relationship with each other simply because the systems to
do so are in place. In this study, we examined factors that affect the formation and development of
interorganizational relationships on online exchanges, particularly in a global setting.
Using information signaling theory (Spence, 1973), we treated perceived level of national integrity and
legal structure in the supplier’s country as indices that are difficult for suppliers to alter, and third-party
verifications and web seals on B2B exchanges as costly signals that suppliers can manipulate at their
discretion. Our results show that supplier indices and signals have positive effects on buyers’ trust.
Hypotheses 4a and 4b suggested that, with increased experience (more past transactions), the effect
of indices such as legal structure and national integrity would decline. This would be evidenced by
negative coefficients for interactions of the respective indices and past transactions. We did find such
an effect for legal structure by past transactions (β5= -.09, p < .05). However, the estimated coefficient
for national integrity by past transactions was not significant (β3= .10, p > .10), which suggests that
national integrity is still a consideration even with much past experience. A possible explanation for
this non-significant effect is that national integrity and individual suppliers’ integrity are more closely
associated than we expected – buyers may expect social norms to strongly influence individual
suppliers’ behaviors, even for those suppliers whom they have transacted with. Since integrity is a
key component of trust, and repair of trust due to integrity-related violations (e.g., dishonest behavior)
is difficult (Kim, Dirks, & Cooper, 2004; Kim, Ferrin, & Cooper, 2009), buyers’ perceptions of national
integrity may still matter even when they have completed many transactions with the suppliers in the
past. Finally, we also found that buyers’ trust positively affects their supplier-selection decisions.
Buyers were more likely to purchase from suppliers whom they trust more (β1 = .93, p < .01).
Apart from third-party verifications, another potential signal for suppliers in B2B exchanges is paid
membership. Surprisingly, we found a weak negative relationship between buyer’s trust and paid
membership (β11 = -.16, p < .10), which indicates that buyers may distrust suppliers that are on paid
memberships. We also observed this phenomenon among B2B exchange users. For instance, a
participant in an online community shared their experiences with suppliers on paid membership (Gold
membership) in a B2B exchange (Alibaba.com):
Bear in mind that I have successfully dealt with an Alibaba Gold member, and still do this
day, so I was taken in by the belief that Gold membership meant that the company I was
dealing with would be more genuine, than say a free member seller. I now know that
this is not the case (emphasis added) (Robbobb, 2007).
Our results and the anecdotal evidence suggest that genuine suppliers may not effectively
distinguish themselves from non-genuine ones by subscribing to paid memberships – in fact, such
services seem to have adverse effects on genuine suppliers. Unlike verification services, paid
memberships usually just require suppliers to pay a fee, which may not be effective barriers to
untrustworthy suppliers. Membership fees could be too low to separate types of suppliers, which
leads to a pooling equilibrium.
Our results add to our understanding of cross-border transactions on online B2B exchanges.
Regardless of whether B2B transactions occur within or across borders, or through online exchanges
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or physical channels, buyers look for certain qualities in suppliers – competency, integrity, and
benevolence. However, it is more challenging to identify these qualities in cross-border e-commerce
due to information asymmetry in online markets. Moreover, research in localized B2B e-commerce
typically focuses on technological structure, particularly the situational normality and structural
assurance of the Internet or platforms (e.g., Pavlou, 2002; Pavlou & Ratnasingam, 2003;
Ratnasingam, 2005). However, these factors, cannot explain why a buyer’s trust in suppliers from
different countries may differ on a B2B exchange. A favorable and secured online platform may not
be a sufficient condition for global e-commerce transactions to occur because a buyer’s trust in
foreign suppliers and the buyer’s purchase intention also depend on factors that are external to the
platform. Our results show that it is necessary to examine social-economic characteristics in partners’
countries in globalized B2B e-commerce.
Furthermore, supplier verifications may be more salient when cross-border transactions take place on
online exchanges instead of through traditional channels. Earlier studies, particularly those that
predate the Internet era, have considered the importance of foreign supplier certifications in
international sourcing through physical channels (e.g., Birou & Fawcett, 1993; Scully & Fawcett,
1994). In these cases, an implicit assumption is that the suppliers’ certifications are authentic.
However, the importance of authenticating trading partners’ information, is a relatively new
phenomenon with the proliferation of online platforms (e.g., Basu & Muylle, 2003; Lee, 2002). As we
note earlier, the relatively low costs of exchange memberships lead to problems such as
misrepresentation and phantom suppliers. Thus, in the context of exchange platforms, the
authenticity of a firm’s information could be as important as the information itself.

6.1. Theoretical Implications
With the Internet and e-commerce technology, organizations can now easily look beyond their local
markets for new buyers and suppliers. While participating in the global marketplace is attractive, the
risks and uncertainties that come with it are qualitatively different from those that arise in domestic
exchange. By focusing on globalized B2B e-commerce, we see important factors of trust that are not
salient in localized commerce of any kind. Our findings show that perceptions of country and supplier
attributes influence buyers’ trust. It is important to account for such indices and signals when studying
information asymmetry and signaling. Indices are often treated as given. This study suggests that they
have informational impact precisely because they are relatively unalterable by suppliers.
We expected that perceptions of supplier-country attributes would have less effect as the buyer
gained experience with the supplier. The actual picture is more complicated. Whereas the effects of
legal structure on a buyer’s trust diminished with repeated transactions, national integrity remained
influential. These differences may be due to the different basis for each perception. Perceived
national integrity is a cognition-based trust mechanism. It influences judgment of trustworthiness via a
categorization process, where an entity in an untrustworthy culture is expected to be untrustworthy
(Zaheer & Zaheer, 2006). In cross-border e-commerce, even though a supplier is highly rated in
terms of their ability, benevolence, and/or integrity based on their performance in prior transactions,
the larger context may make trusting the supplier unwise or indicate the need for lower trust. For
example, when opportunism is common or highly tolerated in a particular culture, high integrity and
benevolence of an individual may be insufficient assurance that the individual will not be opportunistic
(Wicks, Berman, & Jones, 1999). Therefore, the stereotyping of counterparts’ national characteristics
not only affects initial trust formation (Ariño et al., 2001), but it also influences subsequent trust
development as relationships between the partners grow.
Perceived legal structure, in contrast, is an institution-based trust mechanism. Institution-based trust
is important when there are limited prior exchanges between buyers and suppliers (Zucker, 1986).
However, third-party, institutional mechanisms provide fewer cues about individual suppliers’
competency. While the legal structure and licensing requirements in a country provide general
indications of the quality of typical suppliers, a buyer learns about the ability of a particular supplier as
the exchanges between them increase. Furthermore, although the enforceability of contracts and
legal recourses are important in cross-border transactions, these considerations are more important
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when the partners are unfamiliar with each other. In inter-organizational relationships, buyers and
suppliers may avoid invoking legal sanctions when trade disputes occur, as doing so is costly and
interferes with their desire to continue doing business with one another (Macaulay, 1963). Instead,
they try to resolve disputes through direct negotiations. Thus, when buyers and suppliers can assess
each other’s trustworthiness through direct means and exchanges, institution-based trust
mechanisms become less influential. As a result, buyers’ reliance on the legal system in suppliers’
countries decreases with repeat transactions. Work in this area should account for the length and
strength of buyer-suppliers relationships when examining institution-based trust.
In addition, this study extends research on how online exchanges mechanisms, such as feedback
systems, affect a buyer’s trust in the community of suppliers on the exchanges (Pavlou, 2002; Pavlou
& Gefen, 2004). Just because a buyer trusts the community of suppliers does not mean that they
have the same level of trust in every individual supplier in that community. Ultimately, trust at the
dyadic buyer-supplier level plays an important role in shaping individual buyers’ relationships with
their suppliers. We see here that suppliers can differentiate themselves on an exchange by sending
credible and important signals of their trustworthiness through third-party verifications.

6.2. Managerial Implications
Do the estimated effects in this study have meaningful consequences for buyers and suppliers on
B2B exchanges and for policy makers? To address this, we estimated the economic impacts of
supplier verification and changes in perceived national integrity using the SEM results in Table 3
(Model 2). The expected value of supplier verification on the B2B exchange was 22.32 percent (.93
(β1) x .24 (β6)) of the transaction value. Using the median transaction value of US$30,000 and
assuming a supplier is considered for 12 purchases per year on the exchange, the expected value for
6
the supplier of being verified was US$80,352 annually . Since the primary context of this study was in
cross-border transactions, and perceived country characteristics affect all suppliers within a country,
we estimated the impact of perceived national integrity on the external trade of an economy. The
expected value of a .01-point improvement in perceived national integrity (measured on a 5-point
scale) was .17 percent (.93 (β1) x .18 (β2) x .01) of the total export value of a country. Using the 2008
trade statistics for China, for instance, a .01-point increase in its perceived national integrity has an
7
expected value of US$2.43 billion . While this figure is only suggestive, it indicates the potential
impact of even small changes in perceived country characteristics.
Therefore, suppliers should be aware of how buyers’ perceptions of the legal structure and national
integrity in their countries affect buyers’ trust. A buyer's trust due to country attributes is essentially
beyond an individual supplier’s control. Moreover, perceptions of country attributes of a particular
country may differ among buyers, which makes it more challenging for individual suppliers to come up
with an optimal strategy to engender and sustain trust. As such, what might be needed is a concerted
effort to improve the perceived legal structure and national integrity of suppliers at the industry or
country level. This can sometimes be done through voluntary business associations developing
accreditation standards and self-regulation. Such improvements can benefit both individual suppliers
and the respective countries as a whole. For example, Knack and Keefer (1997) found that a 10
percent increase in the level of trust in a society was associated with a .8 percent rise in annual
growth in per capita income. The analysis in our study also shows that a small change in perceived
national integrity can have a relatively significant impact on a country’s external trade.
The negative relationship between buyer’s trust and paid membership has important implications for
B2B exchanges. Paid memberships are important revenue sources for these exchanges. While there
are other reasons why suppliers subscribe to paid membership, such as to communicate more
information or enjoy better customer support on the exchanges, it is nevertheless important for
exchanges to explore how they can help those trustworthy suppliers who take up paid membership to
6

7
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Users’ testimonials in various B2B exchanges indicated that suppliers received between 20 and 200 enquiries per month. Our
assumption of the supplier being considered for 12 purchases per year is therefore quite conservative.
The value of China’s export to the rest of the world was US$1,430.7 billion in 2008. (Source: http://www.uschina.org/statistics/
tradetable.html)
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increase the buyers’ trust and eventually sales through their online marketplaces. One suggestion is
for B2B exchanges to create different classes of paid memberships, and entry into certain
membership classes requires suppliers to meet additional criteria that credibly signal high
trustworthiness, such as suppliers’ track record on the exchanges. This could help buyers
differentiate among suppliers based on paid memberships.

6.3. Limitations and Suggestions for Future Studies
In this study, we examined the relationship between buyers’ trust and their perceptions of suppliers’
country attributes. Reverse causality is a potential problem: a buyer’s trust in a supplier could affect
their perceptions of the supplier’s country, particularly if that supplier is the only supplier from that
country with whom the buyer has interacted. Reverse causality becomes less of a problem as the
buyer interacts with more suppliers from that country. In this study, buyers reported that, on average,
they purchased from between one and four other suppliers from the referent supplier’s country.
Therefore, we do not expect that reverse causality was a major problem in this study.
In terms of the theoretical model, a possible extension is to examine the direct and indirect influences
of industry-level perceptions on buyers’ trust. For example, safety issues in China’s toy and dairy
industries could have affected the perceived trustworthiness of suppliers in these industries
(Fairclough, 2007; Chao, 2008). For example, the Dairy Association of China estimated that it would
take about two years to restore consumer confidence following the food safety incident in 2008,
where milk and infant formula were adulterated with melamine (Zhou, 2008). There might also be
spillover effects to other industries in the country, thus indirectly affecting buyers’ perceptions of the
country attributes. Including perception of industry-level attributes in the model would strengthen our
understanding of how such higher-level perceptions influence trust at dyadic levels.

7. Conclusion
Therefore, is the world really flat as Friedman (2005) asserts? Perhaps less so than Friedman thinks.
Although physical and geographical boundaries are now less of an obstacle in economic exchanges,
they still play important roles in economic agents’ attitudes, behaviors, and decisions. Hence there is
a need to examine how cross-boundaries exchanges and relationships in all commerce are shaped
by country characteristics. Increasingly, transactions are taking place globally, in B2B commerce and
elsewhere. Consumers all over the world can now purchase from online retailers based in the US
(e.g., Amazon.com) or individuals (e.g., through eBay). Yet most research in e-commerce and
sourcing focuses mainly on deals that occur locally (particularly in the US). Adopting a crossboundary and global perspective in e-commerce studies would enrich research and help to further
maximize the benefits that the Internet and e-commerce bring to the global marketplace.
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Appendices
Appendix A.
Table A-1. Buyers’ Characteristics (Location, Product Category, Company Size, and ECommerce Experience)
Buyer's continent

a

Product category

n

No. of employees

n

n

Africa

46 Agriculture & Food

17 1 to 4

56

Americas

21 Apparel & Accessories

11 5 to 9

68

Asia

168 Arts & Crafts

4

10 to 10

61

Europe

24 Auto parts & Accessories

8

20 to 99

65

Oceania

28 Bags, Cases, & Boxes

1

100 to 499

24

Chemicals

32 500 or more

Computer Products

13

Construction & Decoration

17

Consumer Electronics

17 Less than US$100,000

55

Electrical & Electronics

28 US$100,000 to US$499,000

71

Furniture & Furnishing

2

40

Health & Medicine

18 US$1 million to US$4.9 million

81

Lights & Lighting

6

15

Machinery

31 US$10 million to US$49.9 million

12

Metallurgy, Mineral, & Energy

21 US$50 million to US$99.9 million

5

Office Supplies

5

8

Security & Protection

1

Sporting Goods & Recreation

4

Textile

13 1 year or less

54

Tools & Hardware

3

Between 1 and 3 years

85

Toys

4

Between 3 and 5 years

52

Transportation

4

More than 5 years

96

Others

27

Sales in previous year

US$500,000 to US$999,000

US$5 million to US$9.9 million

US$100 million or more

B2B e-commerce experience

13

n

n

a

Note: based on the imminent purchases which respondents considered during the survey.
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Appendix B.
Table B-1. Survey Measures
Construct

a

Purchase intention

Is it likely that you would buy from Supplier X for the purchase that you are
thinking about?

Buyer’s trust

To what extent do you agree with the following statements:
•
Supplier X is very capable of performing its job.
•
I am confident about Supplier X’s capabilities.
•
Supplier X is well qualified.
•
Supplier X would not knowingly do anything to hurt me.
•
Supplier X really looks out for what is important to me.
•
Supplier X will go out of its way to help me.
•
I never have to wonder whether Supplier X will stick to its word.
•
Supplier X tries to be fair in dealings with others.
•
Sound principles seem to guide the Supplier X's behavior.
•
Supplier X can be trusted.

National integrity

In your opinion, how likely would suppliers from Supplier X‟ s country do the
following:
•
Behave with integrity
•
Do the right things in business deals always, even when no one is
watching

Legal structure

How confident are you with the legal system in Supplier X’s country?
In your opinion, how effective are the laws and regulations in Supplier X’s
country concerning the following activities:
•
Governing operations of the suppliers
•
Resolving business disputes

Supplier verification

What is the verification status of Supplier X in the exchange?

Past transactions

How many times has your company purchased from Supplier X in the last 12
months?

Price performance

How does Supplier X compare to other suppliers in terms of price?

Product performance

How does Supplier X compare to other suppliers in terms of product availability?

Delivery performance

How does Supplier X compare to other suppliers in terms of delivery?

Non-member

Is Supplier X listed in the B2B Exchange? b

Paid member

What is the membership type of Supplier X in the exchange?

Same country

Are Supplier X and buyer from the same country? b

China supplier

Is Supplier X based in China? b

a
b

911

Item

“Supplier X” in the question stems is the supplier’s company name or initial as provided by the buyer.
Not an actual item in the survey – the value is obtained from the buyer’s responses to items concerning the buyer’s and the
suppliers’ demographic profiles.
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Appendix C.
Table C-1. Average National Integrity, Legal Structure, and Corruption Perception Index (CPI)
Scores of Supplier’s Country
Country

National integrity

Legal structure

CPI

n

Armenia

5.0

4.3

3.0

1

Australia

4.0

3.7

8.6

4

Austria

4.0

4.0

8.1

1

Bahrain

5.0

5.0

5.0

1

Belgium

3.5

4.6

7.1

3

Benin

3.0

3.3

2.7

1

Botswana

2.5

2.3

5.4

1

Brazil

3.2

2.1

3.5

3

Bulgaria

3.0

3.0

4.1

1

Canada

3.5

3.5

8.7

2

China

3.3

2.8

3.5

403

Congo, Dem. Rep.

3.0

2.3

1.9

1

Denmark

5.0

4.3

9.4

1

Egypt

3.0

2.0

2.9

1

Finland

5.0

4.7

9.4

1

France

4.5

4.3

7.3

1

Germany

4.1

4.2

7.8

9

Hong Kong

3.5

3.7

8.3

10

India

3.4

3.3

3.5

34

Indonesia

3.4

2.5

2.3

4

Iran

3.0

2.3

2.5

1

Italy

3.5

3.7

5.2

2

Japan

4.0

3.7

7.5

1

Kuwait

4.0

4.0

4.3

1

Malaysia

2.8

2.8

5.1

2

Mexico

3.5

3.0

3.5

1

New Zealand

5.0

4.3

9.4

1

Nigeria

3.3

3.7

2.2

9

Norway

4.5

4.3

8.7

1

Pakistan

3.5

2.9

2.4

3

Peru

4.0

3.7

3.5

1

Qatar

4.5

4.7

6.0

1

Romania

4.0

4.3

3.7

1

Russia

4.5

3.9

2.3

5

Saudi Arabia

3.0

3.0

3.4

1

Singapore

3.0

3.7

9.3

2

Slovenia

4.0

2.3

6.6

1
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Table C-1. Average National Integrity, Legal Structure, and Corruption Perception Index (CPI)
Scores of Supplier’s Country (cont.)
National integrity

Legal structure

CPI

n

South Africa

Country

4.5

4.0

5.1

2

South Korea

3.5

4.0

5.1

3

Spain

5.0

4.3

6.7

1

Switzerland

4.5

3.0

9.0

1

Taiwan

3.9

3.2

5.7

13

Thailand

5.0

4.0

3.3

1

Turkey

4.8

4.5

4.1

4

Ukraine

4.2

4.2

2.7

3

United Arab Emirates

3.5

3.2

5.7

4

United Kingdom

3.0

4.2

8.4

4

United States

4.0

3.7

7.2

19

Vietnam

3.0

2.7

2.6

1

Zambia

3.0

2.7

2.6

1

Note: The items that measure perceived national integrity and legal structure are on a scale of 1 (least favorable) to 5 (most
favorable). The CPI index score ranges from 0 (high corruption) to 10 (low corruption).
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Appendix D. Preliminary Analyses
Our survey respondents were from various countries in different continents. We used a Kruskal-Wallis
test to assess whether there are differences among respondents from different countries. We found
no significant differences in terms of company’s sales (H = 21.66, p > .10), respondent’s working
experience (H = 18.56, p > .10), and B2B e-commerce experience (H = 13.93, p > .10) among
respondents from different countries. However, the number of employees in the respondent’s
company (H = 46.33, p < .01) and their education (H = 52.10, p < .01) are statistically different, which
reflects differences in economic and social structures across respondents’ countries. Based on these
results, we believe it is reasonable to pool our respondents across countries.
Next, we assessed the presence of common method variance in our data in two ways. First, we
conducted Harman’s one-factor test and found that the scale items load onto more than one factor
(Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). Second, we compared (1) the covariance of buyer’s trust in and likelihood
of purchasing from one supplier (i.e., within-supplier covariance), and (2) the covariance of buyer’s
trust in one supplier and likelihood of purchasing from the other supplier (i.e., between-supplier
covariance). The within-supplier covariance was at least 1.5 times the between-supplier covariance,
which indicates that common method variance does not appear to account for the relationship
between buyer’s trust and purchase intention. The within-supplier covariance of buyer’s trust in and
likelihood of purchasing from the first supplier was .28; the between-supplier covariance of buyer’s
trust in the second supplier and the likelihood of purchasing from the first supplier was .18. The
within-supplier covariance of buyer’s trust in and likelihood of purchasing from the second supplier
was .32; the between-supplier covariance of buyer’s trust in the first supplier and the likelihood of
purchasing from the second supplier was .11.
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-0.04 -0.12 -0.12 -0.16 -0.10 -0.19 -0.30 -0.27 -0.26 -0.55
3.79
1.10

Paid member

Same country

China supplier

Mean

Variance

17

18

19

0.08

0.46

0.32

0.19

0.10

0.48

0.44

0.32

0.20

0.11

0.06

0.18

0.17

0.11

0.06

0.07

0.09

0.09

0.17

0.17

0.13

0.09

0.12

0.18

0.48
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0.58

3.78

0.06

0.66

3.88

0.03

0.64

3.79

0.02

1.11

0.00

0.02

1.44

0.00

0.08

1.44

0.00

1.43

0.00

2.18

0.00

2.18

0.00

-0.06

0.10

0.21

0.11

-0.06 -0.05 -0.11

0.37

0.14

0.11

0.10

0.16

0.01

0.11

0.22

0.19

0.17

0.05

0.15

0.11

0.19

0.19

0.17

0.04

0.13

0.26

0.08

0.17

0.18

0.13

0.10

0.19

0.22

0.55

0.10

0.12

0.06

0.00

0.38

-0.20

0.04

0.07

0.07

-0.02

1.00

11

1.65

0.00

-0.25

0.24

-0.08

0.15

0.14

0.14

0.13

1.00

12

0.03

0.73

1.00

14

1.04

3.67

0.90

3.76

-0.04 -0.08

-0.06 -0.06

-0.01 -0.05

-0.02

0.43

0.52

1.00

13

1.00

16

0.19

0.95

3.69

0.18

0.24

-0.08 -0.51

-0.05

-0.03 -0.24

0.04

1.00

15

Notes: ^: We assigned the ten survey items that measure buyer’s trust into three parcels: Trust-A (4 items), Trust-B (3 items), and Trust-C (3 items).
*: Mean-centered.

0.01

-0.02 -0.10 -0.07 -0.10 -0.04 -0.01

-0.02

0.09

Non-member

16

0.49

0.46

0.31

Delivery performance

15

0.41

0.32

Product performance

14

0.27

0.28

Price performance

13

0.23

0.08

Past Transactions*

0.13

0.13

0.38

0.47

-0.05

12

0.08

0.11

Supplier verification

0.13

0.28

0.35

0.26

11

0.10

0.03

CPI*

0.30

0.29

0.27

0.87

10

0.25

0.16

Legal structure 3*

0.29

0.21
0.54

9

0.24

0.17

Legal structure 2*

0.24

0.24
0.36

8

0.15

0.11

0.26

0.53

Legal S=structure 1*

0.22

0.19

0.28

0.27

7

0.24

0.18

National integrity 2*

0.84

0.37

6

0.86

0.37
0.85

1.00

0.35

National integrity 1*

1.00

10

5

1.00

9

Trust-C^

1.00

8

4

1.00

7

Trust-B^

1.00

6

3

1.00

5

Trust-A^

1.00

4

2
1.00

3

Purchase intention

2

1

1.00

1

Table E-1. Item-Level Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix for Structural Equation Modeling

0.13

0.16

0.18

-0.04

1.00

17

0.08

0.09

-0.41

1.00

18

0.21

0.70

1.00

19
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Appendix F.
Table F-1. Measurement Model Results
Construct
Buyer's trust

National integrity

Legal structure

Supplier’s
performance

Item

Loading

Std. error

Trust-A

0.92

0.01

Trust-B

0.93

0.01

Trust-C

0.91

0.01

National Integrity 1

0.66

0.07

National Integrity 2

0.80

0.06

Legal Structure 1

0.59

0.05

Legal Structure 2

0.94

0.02

Legal Structure 3

0.92

0.02

CPI

0.28

0.04

Price Performance

0.57

0.06

Product
Performance

0.87

0.03

Delivery
Performance

0.83

0.04

Cronbach’s α
.94

.69

.74

a

.81

Chi-square = 55.20, d.f. = 48, p > .10
CFI = 0.99 RMSEA = 0.02 SRMR = 0.03
All item loadings are significant at p < .01
a
Using casewise deletion for missing data (i.e. “not sure” responses)
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Appendix G. Robustness Analyses 8
Random Effects Model
We estimated random effects models with buyer’s trust as dependent variable using Stata (version
10.1). We assumed that the unobserved effects affect a buyer’s evaluations of both suppliers in the
same manner. For instance, the (unobserved) importance of situational normality or structural
assurance to a buyer should be the same for every supplier whom they were considering. This
assumption justifies the use of random effects model to account for unobserved effects (Wooldridge,
2002) and minimizes the need to include control variables for buyer attributes in our models. We
standardized items that measured legal structure and national integrity and then averaged to form the
respective variables. We also standardized the item for the number of past transactions. We recoded
the responses for each supplier’s relative performance criterion into three dummy variables: (1) better
than other suppliers, (2) worse than other suppliers, and (3) not sure about the performance, with the
base category being the neutral “equal to other suppliers” response. We clustered the observations
by respondent to obtain robust variance estimates (Wooldridge, 2002). Tables G-1 and G-2show the
descriptive statistics and random effects model results, respectively.

8

917

In the interest of space, we summarize the results for most of the robustness analyses in this appendix. Detailed results are
available from the authors.
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1.00

3.81
1.00
5.00
0.56

Minimum

Maximum

Variance

-0.04 -0.16 -0.45

18 China dupplier

Mean

0.12

0.00

0.76

1.36

0.59

2.00

-2.17 -1.38

0.00

0.06

0.10

1

0

0.12

0.06

0.00

0.26

-0.04

-0.01

0.16

0.05

0.06

1.00

3.21

-0.68

0.00

0.25

1

0

0.53

0.10

1

0

0.11

-0.25 -0.05 -0.07

0.24

-0.08 -0.02

0.15

1.00

9

0.65

-0.07

0.04

-0.28

0.13

1

0

0.15

0.03

0.25

1

0

0.53

-0.08

-0.08 -0.01

0.05

-0.02

0.59

-0.11 -0.20

0.65

-0.45

-0.08 -0.25

-0.11 -0.29

0.04

-0.12

0.40

0.39

-0.35 -0.24 -0.10

0.04

0.31

1.00

8

-0.17 -0.30

17 Same country

0.38

-0.20

0.00

0.01

0.03

-0.17

0.45

-0.10 -0.03 -0.07

0.22

0.22

0.10

0.21

16 Paid member

0.09

0.17

0.03

0.09

0.10

0.19

-0.24 -0.44 -0.14

15 Non-member

0.15

0.01

-0.21 -0.09 -0.07

0.40

-0.17 -0.05 -0.02

1.00

14 Delivery performance (not sure)

Product performance (better)

9

0.19

-0.28 -0.11 -0.12

Price performance (not Sure)

8

0.09

1.00

-0.17 -0.09 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.37

0.18

-0.02

13 Delivery performance (worse)

Price performance (worse)

7

0.10

0.28

0.12

1.00

7

0.45

Price performance (better)

6

0.09

0.22

0.14

6

12 Delivery performance (better)

Past transactions

5

0.11

0.11

1.00

5

-0.24 -0.09 -0.08 -0.02 -0.23 -0.27 -0.10

Supplier verification

4

0.48

0.30

4

11 Product performance (not Sure)

Legal structure

3

1.00

0.30

3

-0.32 -0.11 -0.11

National integrity

2

1.00

2

10 Product performance (worse)

Buyer’s trust

1

1

-0.35
-0.11
0.68
-0.06
0.04
-0.05
0.04
0.15
0
1
0.13

-0.16
0.55
-0.11
0.05
0.09
0.16
-0.06
0.05
0
1
0.05

11

1.00

1.00

10

-0.10

Table G-1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix for Random Effects Model

0.25

1

0

0.45

-0.15

0.04

-0.08

0.08

-0.50

-0.25

1.00

12

0.06

1

0

0.07

-0.05

0.11

0.00

0.03

-0.15

1.00

13

0.18

1

0

0.23

0.10

-0.10

0.02

-0.10

1.00

14

0.18

1

0

0.24

-0.51

0.19

-0.24

1.00

15

0.13

1

0

0.16

0.18

-0.04

1.00

16

0.08

1

0

0.09

-0.41

1.00

17

0.21

1

0

0.70

1.00

18
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Table G-2. Random Effects Model Results
Model 1

Model 2

Model

Coeff.

Coeff.

Coeff.

γ1: Constant

3.69** (0.10)

3.69** (0.10)

3.69** (0.10)

γ2: National integrity

0.14** (0.04)

0.13** (0.04)

0.13** (0.04)

-

-0.01 (0.05)

-0.01 (0.04)

0.06 (0.04)

0.08+ (0.04)

0.08+ (0.04)

-

-0.06* (0.03)

-0.06* (0.03)

0.23* (0.11)

0.23* (0.11)

0.24* (0.11)

-

-

0.08 (0.08)

γ8: Past transactions

0.08* (0.03)

0.09** (0.03)

0.09** (0.03)

γ9: Relative price (better)

0.05 (0.07)

0.06 (0.06)

0.06 (0.06)

γ10: Relative price (worse)

-0.04 (0.11)

-0.03 (0.11)

-0.03 (0.11)

γ11: Relative price (not sure)

-0.04 (0.11)

-0.04 (0.11)

-0.04 (0.11)

γ12: Relative product (better)

0.02 (0.07)

0.02 (0.07)

0.03 (0.07)

γ13: Relative product (worse)

-0.69** (0.20)

-0.70** (0.20)

-0.69** (0.20)

γ14: Relative product (not sure)

-0.26* (0.10)

-0.26* (0.10)

-0.25* (0.10)

γ15: Relative delivery (better)

0.35** (0.07)

0.34** (0.07)

0.33** (0.07)

γ16: Relative delivery (worse)

-0.22 (0.16)

-0.22 (0.16)

-0.23 (0.16)

γ17: Relative delivery (not sure)

0.09 (0.09)

0.10 (0.09)

0.09 (0.09)

γ18: Non-exchange member

0.03 (0.07)

0.03 (0.07)

0.04 (0.07)

γ19: Paid membership

-0.11 (0.09)

-0.10 (0.09)

-0.10 (0.09)

γ20: Same country

0.05 (0.12)

0.07 (0.12)

0.06 (0.12)

γ21: China supplier

-0.03 (0.07)

-0.03 (0.07)

-0.02 (0.07)

R-sq (within)

0.27

0.29

0.29

R-sq (between)

0.40

0.39

0.39

R-sq (overall)

0.36

0.36

0.36

Wald χ (d.f.)

233.36 (17)

243.19 (19)

246.99 (20)

0.00

0.00

0.00

Sargan-Hansen statistic

17.61

25.42

25.37

p-value

0.41

0.15

0.19

Dependent variable: buyer's trust

γ3: National integrity x past transaction
γ4: Legal structure
γ5: Legal structure x past transactions
γ6: Supplier verification
γ7: Supplier verification x past transactions

2

Prob > χ

2

+ p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01
Note: Robustness standard errors in parentheses.

We estimated a baseline model with only the main-effects (Model 1), and a model that included the
national integrity and legal structure interaction terms (Model 2). The Sargan-Hansen statistic does
not reject the null hypothesis that the orthogonality assumption is valid for both models (test statistic =
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17.61, p-value = .41 for Model 1; test statistic = 25.42, p-value = .15 for Model 2). This implies that the
9
random effects estimator is consistent .
The results using SEM (Model 2 in Table 3) and random effects models (Model 2 in Table G-2) are
consistent with each other. Perception of national integrity was positively related to buyer’s trust (γ2 =
.13, p < .01), but this relationship was not moderated by past transactions (γ3 = -.01, p > .10). These
results support H1 but not H4a. We also find that past transactions negatively moderate the
relationship between perception of legal structure and buyer’s trust (γ4 = .08, p < .10 and γ5 = -.06, p
< .05). Therefore, H2 and H4b are supported. Similarly, supplier verification had a positive impact on
buyer’s trust (γ6 = .23, p < .05), which supports H3.
We also examined whether the relationship between supplier verification and buyer’s trust was
moderated by past transactions. We added the interaction term “supplier verification x past
transactions” in Model 3 (Table G-2), and found that it was not statistically significant (γ7 = .08, p >
.10). Once again, there is no evidence that supplier verification becomes less important to a buyer
with increased transactions.

Archival Data
Of the 574 suppliers in our dataset, 439 were listed in the B2B exchange. We could uniquely identify
194 (44.2 percent) of these suppliers in the exchange’s online directory, and obtain information about
their membership type and third-party verification status. Excluding cases in which buyers were “not
sure” about suppliers’ membership types or verification status, 61 percent of the membership type
indicator and 66 percent of the verification status indicator in our dataset match the information from the
10
exchange . These are conservative estimates of correct matches because membership types and
verification status could have changed between the time the buyer saw the signals and the time we
obtained the information on the exchange. We checked the robustness of our results by using the B2B
exchange’s data in two cases: (1) whenever exchange and survey data differed, and (2) only when
buyers indicated that they were not sure of a supplier’s membership type or verification status. In both
cases, the results from the recoded dataset are qualitatively similar to those from the original dataset.

Alternative SEM Specifications
We checked the robustness of our structural model to changes in specifications of the latent Buyer’s
Trust variable. There are two ways to re-specify buyer’s trust. First, we could directly set the ten
survey items that measure trust as indicators of buyer’s trust instead of assigning them to parcels
trust-A, trust-B, and trust-C. Second, we could impose a hierarchical structure for the construct
buyer’s trust. This is achieved by modeling buyer’s trust as a second-order factor with presumed
direct causal effects on three first-order factors, and then assigning the ten survey items to these firstorder factors. We estimated our models using these two re-specifications of buyer’s trust and
obtained results that are similar to our original findings in both cases. Both the re-specified models
have adequate model fit. The fit indices for the model with the first re-specification were CFI = .93,
RMSEA = .05, SRMR = .04. The fit indices for the model using the second re-specification were CFI =
.94, RMSEA = .04, SRMR = .04.
We also re-specified the measurement model for the latent legal structure variable by using the three
survey items and removing CPI from our model. The model fit of the resulting structural model was
9

10

If the orthogonality assumption is not satisfied (i.e., unobserved effects do correlate with independent variables), random effects
estimators are not consistent but fixed effects estimators are. However, if the orthogonality assumption is satisfied, random effects
estimators are consistent and also more efficient than fixed effects estimators. The Sargan-Hansen test statistic is a
heteroskedastic- and cluster-robust form of Hausman test that compares random effects and fixed effects estimators (Schaffer &
Stillman, 2010). Failure to reject the null hypothesis in the Sargan-Hansen test (as in our case) implies using random effects is
appropriate.
Using logistic regression, we found that the odds that a supplier was a paid member according to the exchange’s data are three
times larger when a buyer indicated that the supplier was a paid member than when he indicated that the supplier was not. The
predicted probability that a supplier was a paid member based on the exchange’s data was .57 when a buyer indicated that the
supplier was a paid member, and .30 when they indicated that the supplier was not. We could not analyze supplier verification
data as buyers “predicted” non-verified status perfectly (i.e. when they indicated that a supplier was not verified, this was so
according to the exchange’s data). Thus, supplier membership and verification status seem to be salient to buyers, and our survey
data is reasonably robust.
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adequate (CFI = .99, RMSEA = .02, SRMR = .03) and our original results still hold qualitatively. We
then dropped legal structure from our model and used CPI as the sole proxy for buyers’ perceptions
of the legal system in suppliers’ country. The estimates for CPI and interaction between CPI and past
transactions are not significant statistically. Therefore, it is important to measure perceptions of legal
structure at the individual buyers’ level and not rely on global indices such as CPI alone.
Next, we checked the sensitivity of the SEM results to lower assumed reliability of indicators when
fixing the error variance of single-indicator variables. We reduced the assumed reliability of these
variables from .85 to .75 and re-estimated Model 2. The interaction between perceived legal structure
and past transactions was then weakly supported at .10 level (β5 = -.11, p = .054), while the other
results continued to hold at same level of statistical significance.

Multilevel Mixed Effects Model
Because the observations of suppliers are nested within buyers, we used multilevel mixed effects
model to check the robustness of our results. In the multilevel model, we allowed random coefficients
on national integrity, legal structure, supplier verification and past transactions at the buyer level. The
multilevel mixed effects results are consistent with the random effects model results.
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